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A TRIBUTE TO DOUGLAS K. AMDAHL
DEAN JAMES F. HOGGt
I congratulate the William Mitchell Law Review and its edi-
torial board on their decision to dedicate this issue of the Re-
view to Chief Justice Douglas K. Amdahl. He has provided
truly inspiring and effective leadership for the Minnesota
Supreme Court and the entire state court system.
In addition to providing intellectual leadership, the Chief
Justice has responsibility for effective administration of that
system. In his seven years as Chief Justice, Douglas Amdahl
has compiled a remarkable record as an administrator. Early
on he saw all too clearly the problems of case overload and the
consequent deterioration of a primary role of the court-that
of selecting areas of the law ripe for reform or restatement. He
devoted his remarkable energies to the process of persuading
the legislature and the citizens of the state that a new interme-
diate appellate court was required. And he was successful. He
then turned to the problem of the physical needs of the
Supreme Court and the state judicial system. Here we all see
the results as the new Minnesota Judicial Center rises next to
the state capitol. In judging the success of this achievement
and his efforts, we should remember that the first request for
funding for this building was made to the legislature some sev-
enty-five years ago!
His administrative skills have had an impact and are widely
recognized nationally as well as at the state level. He is cur-
rently the Chair of the American Bar Association Committee
on Standards ofJudicial Administration; he is a member of the
American Bar Association Committee on the Revision of the
Standards Relating to Criminal Justice; he is the Chair of the
Conference of Chief Justices' Committee on Authorization or
Withholding of Medical Treatment; Chair of the National
Center for State Courts' Delay Reduction Advisory Commit-
tee; and a member of the Conference of ChiefJustices' Special
Committee to Study the Problems of Civil Jurisdiction within
t President and Dean of William Mitchell College of Law.
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the Exterior Boundaries of Indian Country. He is the past
Chair, Conference of Chief Justices' Committee on the Pro-
curement of Insurance for Judges' Liability and a member of
the American Bar Association Committee on the same subject.
He is a present member and former regent of the International
Academy of Trial Judges and a member of the National Board
of Trial Advocacy.
The smoothly running and effectively operating state judicial
system is a great tribute in itself to Chief Justice Amdahl. At
the same time he has had a powerful hand in the opinion work
of the Supreme Court, shaping our law and legal system.
Constitutional law is an ever-present background or back-
drop to the regular business of judging. Clear constitutional
issues, however, are a more rare phenomenon in the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's practice. Chief Justice Amdahl, writing
for the court, has dealt with at least two such cases of note. In
Thompson v. Estate of Petroff,l the issue presented was whether
Minnesota's survival statute violated the equal protection
clause of the state constitution. This statute permitted an ac-
tion sounding in negligence to survive against the estate of a
wrongdoer but did not permit similarly the survival of an ac-
tion based on intentional tort. The facts of Thompson indicate
there was an assault, following which the plaintiff shot and
killed the wrongdoer and was found to have acted in self-de-
fense. She then sued the wrongdoer's estate.
ChiefJustice Amdahl, writing for the court, traced the origin
of the rule against survival of intentional torts back to medieval
English common law, where the purpose of civil as well as
criminal law was to punish a wrongdoer. Following the death
of the wrongdoer, according to the old logic, there was no fur-
ther purpose in pursuing punishment. Demonstrating a practi-
cal point of view, Chief Justice Amdahl concluded, "[S]ince
compensation rather than punishment is now the essential pur-
pose of any tort cause of action, there seems to be little reason
to exclude only those [causes of action] that evolved from the
punitive, quasi-criminal trespass writs and the even more an-
cient appeal of felony." 2
The court then found the statutory distinctions on
survivability of claims to be "arbitrary in light of the develop-
1. 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982).
2. Id. at 405.
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ment of modern tort law," 3 and violative of the equal protec-
tion provision of the Minnesota Constitution. At the same
time the court concluded that punitive damages should not be
recoverable in such a situation since "[t]he purpose of punitive
damages is to punish the tortfeasor where the act is malicious
or willful, and to deter him from repeating the wrongful act. " 4
This opinion provides an early illustration of the Chief Jus-
tice's clear, crisp and concise style-explaining choices and
policy considerations while relating them to the facts.
Another constitutional issue was presented four years later
in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher.5 Using the same
clear and crisp style, ChiefJustice Amdahl wrote for the court:
"The narrow question presented by this case is what legal stan-
dard applies when a party seeks to restrict access to settlement
documents and transcripts that are made part of a civil court
file by statute."
6
This case involved the sealing of records relating to the set-
tlement of five cases arising out of the Galaxy Airline crash in
Reno, Nevada in 1985. The newspaper intervened in the pro-
ceeding and was unsuccessful at the trial level in persuading
the judge to unseal the records. Arguing before the Court of
Appeals, the paper sought to have the trial judge's order seal-
ing the settlement documents and related transcript over-
turned: "They maintained that Judge Schumacher erred in
applying a common-law standard and asserted that a constitu-
tional standard based on the first amendment freedoms of
speech and press was the proper standard to apply in this
case." 7 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ac-
cepted this argument. The Supreme Court restored the trial
court's order. Emphasizing the narrowness of the question
presented, the court concluded, "[N]o first amendment right
of access exists in the settlement documents and transcripts
sealed by the court." 8
The basis for this decision was found in the strong public
policy of encouraging settlement. Providing access to such
sealed records would discourage settlements rather than en-
3. Id. at 406.
4. Id. at 408.
5. 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986).
6. Id. at 200.
7. Id. at 201.
8. Id. at 204.
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courage them.9 Applying the rule as enunciated, the court
found that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in de-
nying access to the documents in question. Mindful of its re-
sponsibility to teach, the court then went on to explain the
propriety of proceeding in such a case by writ of prohibition
rather than by direct appeal.
Two other decisions, each authored by the Chief Justice, il-
lustrate the role of the court in shaping and developing new
legal standards. In Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc.,,1 a
discharged employee brought suit for, among other things, in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court
made new law by finding such an act to be the basis for a cause
of action under Minnesota law. In this interesting case, the
court changed the old policy, made new policy, articulated the
reasons for the change and the new standard with clarity, and
provided guidance for future application of the new rule. At
the same time, the court reversed the trial court's findings of
fact and corrected the lower court's errors.
In adopting this new tort, the court wrestled with the danger
that emotional injury might be faked or over-dramatized.
Speaking of the old policy and rule the court said, "The re-
quirements that the mental distress be accompanied by physi-
cal injury or be the natural result of some other actionable tort
provide added assurance that the alleged emotional injury ac-
tually occurred and was intentionally inflicted."" Striking out
for new ground, the court further stated, "[W]e no longer feel
that a rule requiring physical injury or an underlying tort is the
most effective way to promote this policy."' 2 Recognizing the
need for caution in pursuing this new tort, the court required
the plaintiff to meet a very high standard of proof. In conclu-
sion, the court held, on the instant facts, that the trial court
erred in submitting the relevant claim to the jury.
Once again, we see the Chief Justice articulating in a very
clear, precise opinion the reasons for adopting the new policy,
and the need for restraint based on the prior policy and con-
cern for the risk of manipulated claims. While the case makes
9. Id. at 205.
10. 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).
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new law, the plaintiff "struck out" since the Supreme Court
reversed the trial court on the facts.
In the second case, Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,' 3
the court faced a new issue of defamation by self-publication.
The plaintiffs were terminated as employees of the defendant
company on grounds of "gross insubordination." In seeking
subsequent employment, they were forced to disclose to pro-
spective employers the fact of their previous termination and
the assigned reason. In the opinion written by the Chief Jus-
tice, the court broke new ground under Minnesota law in find-
ing a basis for a defamation action against the defendant
company notwithstanding the fact that the defamatory words
were published by the plaintiffs.
In so shaping Minnesota law, the court reached out to prece-
dent in a few other states but not without a dissent from one
member of the court. Justice Kelley, noting that "[v]ery few
courts of this nation have recognized this exception,"' 4 con-
cluded, "Now, the only way an employer can avoid litigation
and the possible liability for substantial damages, is to cease
communicating the reason it felt justified the termination, not
only to third persons, but even to the employee himself or her-
self." 15 In addressing this concern, the majority found that the
employer may have a qualified privilege in self-publication
cases but since the jury found actual malice in the case before
them, this qualified privilege was lost on the instant facts.
The court took the opportunity to exclude punitive damages
from any recovery in compelled self-publication cases: "Even
with the qualified privilege, the risk of punitive damages may
prove too great. As a result, the employer may refuse to state a
reason when discharging an employee. As indicated above,
such a result would not serve the interests of the public."' 16
Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found the
trial court's inclusion of compensatory damages for future
harm to be proper.
They also disagreed with the Court of Appeals on an issue of
trial procedure. The appellate court had refused to consider
an erroneous jury instruction because no objection was made
13. 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
14. Id. at 895.
15. Id. at 896.
16. Id. at 892.
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during the trial. The Supreme Court explained that its previ-
ous opinion to that effect did not extend to an objection rais-
ing a potentially fundamental error of law. In such case the
error is reviewable, explained the court, as long as the instruc-
tion was assigned as error in the motion for a new trial. Hav-
ing made its point for the lower courts, the Supreme Court
concluded that the particular error in this case was not prejudi-
cial to the defendant. The court found another jury instruc-
tion on the duty in employment contracts to exercise good
faith to be erroneous, but again found no prejudice in the in-
stant situation.
In other cases, Chief Justice Amdahl, writing for the court,
has shown great concern for process and procedure at the trial
and appellate levels and has emphasized the importance of a
full and complete record. Auge v. 4ugel 7 involved the right of a
custodial parent to remove a child from the State of Minne-
sota. More precisely, the issue was the circumstances under
which a trial judge must hold an evidentiary hearing regarding
the removal of a child from Minnesota.
This opinion reflects the Chief Justice's writing style of full
explanation of applicable policy and how that policy relates to
the facts of the case. The trial court had adopted the referee's
findings. The Supreme Court found important substantive
and procedural defects and took the opportunity to provide
clear guidance for future trial courts on how the legal standard
was to be applied. The ruling also illustrates a profound con-
cern for the child's best interests. The court concluded that
removal should not be denied solely to maintain existing pa-
rental visitation patterns. The court then established and de-
fined a new procedure to be followed in custody removal cases.
In going beyond the facts of the instant case, the court sought
to give broader guidance to the lower courts.
In Moylan v. Moylan,' 8 Chief Justice Amdahl, writing for the
court, addressed another issue of first impression-holding
that the statutory child support guidelines applied to all child
support awards including modifications. Disagreeing with the
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court went on to hold that all
such awards must be supported by detailed findings of fact.
The trial court had made no express findings of fact regarding
17. 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983).
18. 384 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. 1986).
[Vol. 15
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the mother's expenses or the needs of the dependent child.
The Court of Appeals noted this fact but found that express
findings were not required because the mother's expenses and
the child's needs were adequately shown in the record.
In this case the Supreme Court had to exercise its skills to
patch up less than masterful legislation: "The problem with
this statutory scheme is it implies that a court need not make
findings of fact unless it orders child support in an amount be-
low the figure recommended in the guidelines."' 9 The court
rejected this implication, asserting the separate and necessary
role of the court: "We therefore require that in all child sup-
port cases not involving public assistance, the trial court must
make specific findings of fact as to the factors it considered in
formulating the award." 20 The Supreme Court then reversed
the Court of Appeals, holding that "[wlhile the record may
support a trial court's decision, it is nevertheless inadequate if
that record fails to reveal that the trial court actually consid-
ered the appropriate factors." 2 1 The court then went on to
provide helpful advice to the trial judge concerning the nature
of the hearing required by reason of the remand.
In this cross-section of Minnesota Supreme Court decisions
written by Chief Justice Amdahl, we see the hand of the
master-with long personal experience as a trial court judge
himself. He is ever mindful of the teaching and guidance func-
tion of the Supreme Court; and ever concerned for those af-
fected or likely to be affected by the decision. He is humane,
insightful and concerned to explain and communicate both the
policy and the specific application of that policy to the facts
before the court-a consummate writer of clear and concise
opinions. Behind these opinions is a man of formidable ap-
pearance-brush-cut hair-with a remarkable inner sensitivity
and concern for people. He also has a driving energy, a mar-
velous sense of humor and a love of his fellow beings. Chief
Justice Amdahl is a great chiefjustice and we are all the richer
for his dedication and service.
19. Id. at 863.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 865.
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